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Rationality and Theistic Belief, by Mark S. McLeod. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1993. Pp. xiv and 260. $37.50 (cloth). 
DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER, Seattle Pacific University 
Many Christians say that, on occasion, God manifests Himself to them as 
doing something, e.g. guiding, forgiving, or strengthening them, or being 
something, e.g. wise, powerful or loving. They often describe their experi-
ences in much the way we ordinarily describe our perception of nearby 
physical objects. They don't infer that God best explains their experience, nor 
do they indicate that they are merely indirectly aware of Him, say, through 
the words of a friend or by viewing a majestic mountain. Rather, they take it 
that they directly perceive Him, that God directly appears thus-and-so. Their 
description of their experiences leads one to wonder whether such (putative) 
perception of God can justify such beliefs about Him (call them "M-beliefs") 
in the way in which we ordinarily think that (putative) perception of physi-
cal objects in normal circumstances can justify hum-drum perceptual beliefs. 
William Alston has recently argued that this is indeed the case. Suppose he's 
right. One might go on to claim that M-beliefs are as strongly justified as per-
ceptual beliefs. Call this latter claim the parity thesis. 
With the early Alston, let's say that S's belief that x is F is justified (in the 
"weak normative" sense, Jnw) on the basis of (putative) direct awareness 
of x as F if, and only if, S does not have sufficient reason to believe that S's 
belief that x is F was unreliably produced. Then, one version of the parity 
thesis is this: 
PT. We have no better reason to believe that S's M-beliefs are unre-
liably formed than we have to believe that S's hum-drum percep-
tual beliefs are unreliably formed. 
Alston thinks about belief formation in terms of a "doxastic practice," a 
family of ways of going from grounds, experiential and doxastic, to beliefs 
with a certain content. Questions of individuation aside, suppose there is a 
practice of going from sensory experience to hum-drum perceptual beliefs, 
i.e., a practice of objectifying sensory experience in. terms of discrete, per-
sisting objects occupying a three-dimensional space, call it SP. And let's say 
there is a practice of moving from what many Christians take to be direct 
awareness of God to beliefs about Him, i.e., a practice of objectifying such 
experiences in distinctively Christian terms, call it CPo Thus, whether PT is 
true is, in Alston's terms, a question of whether we have better reason to 
believe CP is unreliable than we have to believe SP is unreliable. 
In Rationality and Theistic Belief, Mark McLeod aims, in large part, to 
argue that any version of the parity thesis attributable to Alston is false 
since each one fails to recognize the role of background beliefs in the forma-
tion and justification of M-beliefs. Applied to PT, McLeod's "background 
belief challenge" is this: We can identify x by way of directly experiencing it 
if, and only if, there is some property P such that x has P, P cannot be had 
by any being other than x, and P can be part of the "phenomenological con-
tent" of our experience. Now, for any property P such that the Christian 
438 Faith lind Philosophy 
God has P, either P can be had by some being other than Him or P cannot 
be part of the phenomenological content of our experience. So, we cannot 
identify the Christian God by way of directly experiencing Him. To do that 
we must use distinctively Christian beliefs (not just concepts) to read into 
our experience that it is as an experience of the Christian God. We can, how-
ever, identify physical objects by way of directly experiencing them. Take 
Suzie's house for example. While it has many properties that other things 
have, what makes it unique is that those properties have a specific spa-
tiotemporallocation. Suzie's house has the unique property of being a pink, 
shuttered, ... bungalow at Fourth and Main. Of course, "that I am in one 
neighborhood rather than another, on one street rather than another, is 
given directly in experience"; it is part of the phenomenological content of 
my experience. That's because the "spatial information that picks out where 
I am vis-a-vis the local geography (this neighborhood or that street)" "is part 
of the conceptual scheme I bring to the experience. I objectify the experience 
as Suzie's house - the pink, shuttered bungalow at Fourth and Main." I 
don't use beliefs about my local whereabouts to read into my experience 
that it is an experience of a pink, shuttered,. .. bungalow at Fourth and Main. 
Thus, we can identify a physical object by way of directly experiencing it, 
without using background beliefs in the way background beliefs are used to 
identify God as the object of religious experience. This difference between 
CP and SP - the fact that forming M-beliefs, but not hum-drum perceptual 
beliefs, involves at least a noninferential role for background beliefs - is rea-
son to believe PT false. Here's why. First, complexity. A belief whose forma-
tion involves a noninferential role for background beliefs is more likely to 
be false since there are more complicated intellectual moves in its formation, 
"there's more room for slip-ups or mistakes." Second, arbitrariness. 
Distinctively Christian background beliefs enable one to identify what they 
are experiencing as the Christian God rather than some other god. Without 
them, one's experience has no more content than "a (more or less) vague 
sense of a reality beyond the merely physical or even the merely (humanly) 
personal." Thus, if those who form M-beliefs are to avoid arbitrarily reading 
Christian theology into their experience, their distinctively Christian back-
ground beliefs need justification. As such, we have reason to believe that CP 
is less trustworthy than SP. 
What should we make of McLeod's background belief challenge to PT? 
There are several mistakes and oversights. Here are five. 
1. For starters, Alston never ever affirmed any version of the parity thesis. 
He explicitly denies it in Perceiving God, and even in his earlier writings he 
never says or implies that the degree of justification that attends M-beliefs 
(or the degree of rationality that attends engagement in CP) is just as 
strong as the degree of justification that attends hum-drum perceptual 
beliefs (or the degree of rationality that attends engagement in SP). At 
most, Alston implies that there is a common structure of justification, or 
that the same sort of justification enjoyed by hum-drum perceptual beliefs 
is enjoyed by M-beliefs under certain conditions, or that we have no good 
reason to deny either of these things. 
2. How much less justified are M-beliefs than hum-drum perceptual 
beliefs? McLeod doesn't say. For all he argues, the fact that M-belief forma-
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tion involves a noninferential role for background beliefs is, in itself, epis-
temically negligible, resulting in, say, the difference between being justified 
in believing that I am eating bran flakes now and being justified in believ-
ing that I ate bran flakes a few minutes ago. One is left puzzled: where's 
the punch behind the "challenge"? 
3. Suppose that M-belief formation involves a non inferential role for 
background beliefs but perceptual belief formation does not. And suppose 
that, all else being equal, this fact suffices to show PT false. Is all else equal? 
McLeod doesn't say. For all he argues, there may be respects in which per-
ceptual beliefs are justificatorily inferior to M-beliefs (reasons to think SP is 
unreliable that do not apply to CP); if there are, then, for all McLeod 
argues, PT is true. 
4. Suppose the background beliefs I use to form M-beliefs are maximally 
Jnw for me: I haven't the slightest bit of reason to think they are unreliably 
produced. Why, then, aren't my M-beliefs at least as Jnw as my perceptual 
beliefs, even though my M-beliefs depend on background beliefs for their 
generation and justification and perceptual beliefs do not? McLeod says the 
sheer fact that background beliefs are involved in their formation renders M-
beliefs less reliably produced than perceptual beliefs. Here his points about 
complexity and arbitrariness enter. What should we make of them? 
The point about complexity assumes that if x is a more complex cogni-
tive process than y, then x is likely to be less reliable and trustworthy than 
y. McLeod thinks this is obvious. But it isn't. 
Let's think about the matter briefly. Suppose I'm in the Kingdome 
watching Ken Griffey, Jr. play baseball. I'm directly aware of him slam-
ming a home run, catching a fly ball, etc. Now compare this with another 
case. Suppose I'm watching a live broadcast of the game on NBC. I'm 
aware of him hitting a home run in virtue of being aware of the television. 
My belief that Griffey just hit a home run is the product of a more complex 
process in the case of indirect rather than direct awareness. Is that sufficient 
reason to suppose that it is more likely that my belief is false in the indirect 
case as opposed to the direct case? I can't tell. The additional complexity 
looks epistemically negligible. Of course, we can think of cases in which 
complexity does affect reliability, e.g., long versus short division. But note 
that in such cases experience has taught us that it is more likely that we 
will make a mistake using the more complex process. These reflections 
reveal two questions relevant to discerning whether, in any particular pair 
of cases, we have reason to think that the more complex cognitive process 
is likely to be less reliable than the simpler. How much more complex is x 
than y? Do we have a comparative record of success and failure? If x is 
only marginally more complex than y, then, lacking reason to be suspi-
cious, we should not infer that x is more likely to be unreliable. On the 
other hand, if we have no reason at all to think that the additional com-
plexity of some particular process x makes it less reliable than y, then we 
should not suppose otherwise. Perhaps experimental pscyhology has 
something to say about complexity and reliability. 
What about the arbitrariness point? It does nothing to show that CP is 
less reliable than SP. The use of Christian background beliefs in the forma-
tion of M-beliefs is objectionably arbitrary only if those background beliefs 
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are unjustified, and McLeod gives us no reason to think they are unjustified. 
The situation here is this: McLeod relies heavily on the premise that due 
to the role of background beliefs in their formation, M-beliefs are not as 
strongly justified as perceptual beliefs. Both of his arguments for it are 
underdeveloped. 
5. McLeod says that forming M-beliefs must involve at least a noninfer-
ential role for Christian background beliefs. Unless one's experience is 
informed by Christian theology, the content of one's experience cannot be, 
phenomenologically speaking, distinctively Christian. No doubt, Christian 
theology can, and sometimes does, play this role. But why suppose it must? 
Because "there is nothing in the phenomenological aspect of the experience 
alone that entitles the perceiver to claim that it is an experience of [the 
Christian] God" rather than some other god. And that's because we are 
able to identify x by way of directly experiencing it if, and only if, there is 
some property P such that x has P, P cannot be had by any being other 
than x, and P can be part of the "phenomenological content" of our experi-
ence (call this McLeod's principle of perceptual identification); but God has no 
such property since "the mere appearance of god-like features always 
leaves one with doubts, or possible grounds for doubt, as to the identity of 
the object of experience." Thus, the content of one's experience can be dis-
tinctively Christian only if one uses distinctively Christian beliefs to inter-
pret one's religious experience. 
At least three lines of response come to mind. 
Response 1. We must distinguish two matters: what the phenomenologi-
cal content of one's (putative) experience of God is and what the epistemic 
status of one's M-belief is. Phenomenological description is not epistemolo-
gy. Even if nothing in the phenomenological content of the experience enti-
tles one's M-belief or relieves one of all doubt, that content may still be, 
phenomenologically speaking, of the Christian God. So it does not follow 
that distinctively Christian background beliefs must be used in order for 
the phenomenological content to be of the Christian God. McLeod's argu-
ment is a non-sequitur. (Note: I have not here challenged McLeod's princi-
ple of perceptual identification.) 
Response 2. Let us continue to suppose with McLeod that we can identify 
the Christian God by way of direct awareness if, and only if, He has some 
uniquely instantiable property which can appear in the phenomenological 
content uf our experience. Why should we suppose that being God the 
Father or being Christ isn't one of them? The property of being God the 
Father - that person - cannot be had by anyone else. McLeod will insist 
that one cannot be sure that the non-phenomenal object of the experience 
was in fact what one takes it to be. But, again: this worry is completely 
irrelevant to the question of whether the phenomenological content of 
one's experience can be, e.g., of Christ without one's Christian background 
beliefs being used to form that content. 
In short, then, we might accept McLeod's principle of perceptual identi-
fication, say that part of the phenomenological content of distinctively 
Christian experience is that it is, irreducibly, of God the Father or of Christ, 
and note that being God the Father or being Christ are properties uniquely 
instantiable. 
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Response 3. Since the position sketched in Response 2 is false, 
McLeod's principle of perceptual identification is false, at least if we can 
identify any individual by way of experience. Suppose, for conditional 
proof, that I can identify Suzie's house by way of experience. Now sup-
pose, for reductio, that McLeod's principle is true, hence that I can iden-
tify Suzie's house by way of experience only if Suzie's house has some 
uniquely instantiable property P that can appear in the phenomenologi-
cal content of my experience. Every property that Suzie's house has is 
such that either (i) it is possible that some other object have it or (ii) it 
cannot appear in the phenomenological content of my experience. So, I 
cannot identify Suzie's house by way of experience, which contradicts 
our initial supposition. Thus, if I can identify Suzie's house by way of 
experience, then McLeod's principle is false. 
What should we make of the premise that every property that Suzie's 
house has is such that either (i) it is possible that some other object have it 
or (ii) it cannot appear in the phenomenological content of my experience? 
McLeod asserts that spatio-temporallocation can be part of the phenome-
nological content of experience. Well, suppose it can. Still, there is a possi-
ble world in which there is a house that is qualitatively, but not numerical-
ly, identical with Suzie's house and that occupies all and only the spatio-
temporal points that Suzie's house in fact occupies. So, contrary to what 
McLeod says, it is possible that some other object has the property of being 
a pink, shuttered, ... bungalow at Fourth and Main. Might some other 
uniquely instantiable property of Suzie's house possibly appear in the phe-
nomenological content of experience? Friends of Response 2 will say "yes." 
I know of no other plausible candidate. 
Here's another argument. The sort of properties that can appear in the 
phenomenological content of experience are qualitative properties. But the 
sort of properties which it is not possible for some other object to have are 
non-qualitative, say, a haecceity. So, every property of an object, and hence 
Suzie's house, is such that either (D it is possible that some other object have 
it or (ii) it cannot appear in the phenomenological content of my experience. 
I fear I may leave the impression that McLeod only writes about (puta-
tive) parity theses attributable to Alston. This is not the case. McLeod 
applies the background belief challenge to (putative) parity theses attribut-
able to Plantinga, unsuccessfully, I think. Also against Plantinga "the 
Universality Challenge" is developed, which hangs on the (false) claim that 
S's belief that p is properly basic only if the nontheistic experience that gen-
erates it is such that, if a fully rational person Thad S's experience, T 
would believe that p. (One can be fully rational yet defective in other ways 
that prevent one from believing p.) Finally, McLeod develops in an inter-
esting but frequently unclear fashion what he calls "the new parity" thesis 
(which isn't new): beliefs about God are just as rational as beliefs about 
human persons. In the end, I can't see why the new parity thesis is any bet-
ter off than others, e.g. PT. 
The view that background beliefs playa significant epistemic role in 
the formation of M-beliefs but not hum-drum perceptual beliefs is wor-
thy of reflection and research. And the view that the epistemology of M-
beliefs is more fruitfully compared to the epistemology of beliefs about 
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other human persons than nonhuman physical objects is promising. I 
hope someone will soon do a good job of defending them.! 
NOTES 
1. For helpful comments on earlier drafts I am grateful to Frances 
Howard-Snyder. 
The Problem of Hell, by Jonathan L. Kvanvig. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993. Pp.viii and 182. $24.95 (cloth). 
FRANCES HOWARD-SNYDER, Western Washington University 
An instance of the problem of evil, the problem of hell is particularly trou-
bling for theism, since hell is a terrible thing, the worst thing that can hap-
pen to anyone, and unlike other kinds of suffering, one for which the suffer-
er cannot be compensated in the long run. Why would a perfectly loving 
God permit people to suffer such evil? Why indeed would He condemn 
them to it? Jonathan Kvanvig explores the tension between hell and any 
form of theism which conceives of God as perfectly good. But he discusses 
the problem primarily from the point of view of Christianity. He motivates 
the problem by describing and rejecting a number of traditional accounts of 
hell. In the latter half of the book he offers an account of his own and 
attempts to show that it avoids the difficulties that faced the other accounts. 
He begins by discussing the 'strong view' of hell. This, he believes, is the 
standard view of hell, although he believes that scripture neither explicitly 
endorses it nor entails it. The strong view has four components: 
(H1) The Anti-Universalism Thesis: Some persons are consigned 
to hell; 
(H2) The Existence Thesis: Hell is a place where people exist, if 
they are consigned there; 
(H3) The No Escape Thesis: There is no possibility of leaving hell 
and nothing one can do to change, or become in order to get out of 
hell, once one is consigned there; and 
(H4) The Retribution Thesis: The justification for hell is retributive 
in nature, hell being constituted to mete out punishment to those 
whose earthly lives and behavior warrant it. [19] 
Interestingly, this list doesn't mention the fact that hell is unpleasant or oth-
erwise bad. Perhaps that is too obvious to need mentioning. He also 
assumes, but doesn't include here, that all human beings deserve hell. This 
claim makes trouble for the strong view, but he doesn't consider rejecting it. 
He discusses two versions of the strong view. The first (the 'equal punish-
ment version') claims that all sinners receive the same punishment; the sec-
ond (the 'differential punishment version') that, although all sinners receive 
everlasting punishment, some are made to suffer worse than others. He criti-
cizes the first as being both unfair and unjust, "unfair, because not everyone 
is equally guilty; unjust, because not all sin, if any, deserves an infinite pun-
